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11 Central Bank Independence and
Economic Performance
N RECENT YEARS MANY countries have
adopted or made progress toward adopting
legislative proposals removing their central
banks from government control, that is, making
them independent. Between 1989 and 1991,
New Zealand, Chile and Canada enacted legisla-
tion that increased the independence oftheir
central banks. The 1992 Treaty on European
Union (Maastricht Treaty) requires European
Community (EC) members to give their central
banks independence as part of establishing the
European Monetary Union. As a result, EC
countries that do not yet have strongly indepen-
dent central banks have introduced legislation
or announced their commitment to make their
central banks more independent.1 Furthermore,
in recent months the governments of Brazil and
Mexico have announced their intentions to in-
troduce legislation to create more independent
central banks.
In view of these developments, it might seem
reasonable to conclude that unambiguous links
had been established between economic perfor-
mance and the degree of central bank indepen-
dence. Interestingly, however, the two post-
World War II star performers among the indus-
trialized economies—Germany and Japan—have
different levels of central bank independence.
The German Bundesbank is viewed as one of
the most independent central banks in the
world, whereas the Bank of Japan is seen as
more subject to government control. Thus the
contrast between the movement to grant central
banks more independence and widely different
degrees of independence across the major econ-
omies raises several questions. Among these are:
Why is the idea of an independent central bank
popular? Are there economic benefits of having
an independent central bank?
This paper examines empirical and theoretical
studies of central bank independence to address
these questions. Empirical researchers have de-
vised measures of independence to focus on the
relationship between central bank independence
and a country’s economic performance. Theo-
retical studies have modeled the strategic be-
‘To meet the level of independence prescribed by the Maas-
tricht Treaty, a central bank must be prohibited from taking
instructions from the government. The term for central
bank governors must be set at a minimum of five years,
although it can be renewed. In addition, the central bank
must be prohibited from purchasing debt instruments
directly from the government (that is, in the primary
market) and from providing credit facilities to the govern-
ment. Both Denmark and the United Kingdom have
reserved the right to decline membership in the European
Monetary Union. Thus neither country has introduced
legislation to ensure conformity of their central banks with
the Maastricht provisions.
For a detailed analysis of the institutional status of the
central banks of the EC countries, see the Committee of
Governors of the Central Banks of the Member States of
the European Economic Community (1993).22
havior of monetary and fiscal policymakers to
he able to compare an economys performance
when policymakers cooperate in setting policies
urith its performance when they do not
cooperate.
‘I’he next section of this paper presents a sur-
vey and evaluation of empirical studies.-Next,
theoretical studies are presented and evaluated.
The final section examines the extent to which
these studies either explain the current move-
ment toward greater central bank independence




Inflation and Central Bank
Independence
As a broad generalization, interest in central
bank indeperide.nce was motivated by the belief
that, if a central bank was free of direct politi-
cal pressure, it would achieve lower and more
stable inflation.’ Bade and Parkin (1985) con-
ducted one of the first empirical studies of this
link. The authors used data for 12 Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) countries in the post-Bretton Woods era
and measured the degree of central bank in-
dependence according to the extent of govern-
ment influence over the finances and policies of
the central bank.’ i’he degree of financial in-
fluence on the central hank was determined by
the government’s ability to set salary levels for
member-s of the governing board of the central
bank, to control the central hank’s budget and
to allocate its profits. The degree of policy in-
tiuence was determined by the government’s
ability to appoint the members of the central
hank governing hoard, government representa-
tion on this hoard, and whether the govern-
ment or’ the central bank was the final policy
authority. Countries were given a rank of one
through four in each category, with four being
the highest level of central hank independence.
Bade and Parkin concluded that the degree of
financial independence of the central hank was
not a significant determinant of inflation in the
post-Bretton Woods period. Policy indepen-
dence, however, was seen as an important de-
terminant of inflation because the two countries
with the highest degree of policy independence
(Germany and Switzerland) had inflation rates
significantly helow those of all other countries
in the sample. They found no significant differ-
ences in inflation performance among countries
with lower rankings of independence in the
post-Bretton Woods era.
Alesina (1988) used the Bade and Parkin (1985)
index hut added the following four countries:
Denmark, New Zealand, Norway and Spain. He
found, as hypothesized, that there was generally
an inverse relationship hetween average infla-
tion rates and the level of central bank in-
dependence.
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) created
two indexes of central hank independence—one
based on economic measures of independence
(with a scale ranging from zero to eight), and
the other based on political measures of in-
dependence (with a scale ranging from zero to
seven).~The political factors were similar to
those identified by Bade and Parkin, The eco-
nomic factors considered were the ability of the
government to determine the conditions under
which it can borrow from the central bank and
the monetary instruments under the control of
the central hank. ‘rhe data set comprised is
OECD countries over the period 1950—89.’ For
the period as a whole, Grilli, Masciandaro and
Tahellini found that economic independence
was negatively related to inflation. Political in-
dependence also had a negative correlation with
inflation, but the relationship was not statistical-
ly significant. Breaking the data into four
decade-long subperiods, they found that neither
measure of independence had a significant ef-
fect on inflation in the fit’st two decades. In the
1970s both measures of independence were sig-
nificant, whereas in the 1980s only the econom-
ic independence measure was significant.
Alesina and Summers (1993) calculated a
measure of central hank independence by aver-
aging the indexes created by Bade and Parkin,
‘Buchanan and Wagner (1977) point out that even an in-
dependent central bank may not be immune from political
pressures and thus exhibit an inflationary bias.
‘The 12 OECD countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, United Kingdom, and United States.
4ln both measures the scale is increasing in the level of in-
dependence.
5Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini add Austria, Denmark,
Greece. New Zealand and Portugal to Bade and Parkin’s
group of countries and eliminate Sweden.Figure 1
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Source: Alesina and Summers (1993).
and Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini.° The
countries included were the same as in Bade
and Parkin with the addition of Denmark, New
Zealand, Norway and Spain. The sample period
was 1955—88.’ As in the previous studies, they
found a negative correlation between the level
of central hank independence arid the rate of
inflation (figure 1). They also found that the
more dependent a central bank was, the greater
the variability in inflation (figure 2). This, they
argued, was a result of a correlation between
the level and variability of inflation.
Cukiermnan (1992) provided an extensive analy-
sis of central bank independence and its rela-
‘See Bade and Parkin (1985) and Grilli, Masciandaro and
Tabellini (1991).
‘See Alesina (1988). Alesina and Summers report that the
results of their study are the same if the data period is res-
tricted to 1973-1988, the post-Bretton Woods era.
‘The sample period for the questionnaire data was 1980-89.
tionship to inflation performance using data for’
1950—89. Unlike previous studies, he used not
only legal measures of central bank indepen-
dence, but also practical measures of the level
of independence. One such measure was the
frequency of turnover of the central bank
governors. Another measure of practical in-
dependence was based on answers from a ques-
tionnaire completed by qualified individuals at
the central banksi’ Cukiet’man’s analysis is the
most comprehensive to date, not only because it
incorporates information about the actual level
of independence a central bank enjoys in prac-
tice, but also because it includes a sample of 70
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‘The questionnaire data were available for only 24
countries.24
Figure 2







Index of Central Bank Independence
Source: Alesina and Summers (1993).
bank independence affects the rate of inflation
in the expected direction.”°This result was also
found by Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti
(1992).”
Central Bank Independence and
the Real Economy
Although most of the empirical work focused
on the relationship between central bank in-
dependence and the rate of inflation, some
studies examined the link between indepcn-
dence and economic output. if an independent
central bank can produce lower inflation than a
dependent central bank, does this come at the
cost of lower output? Conversely, are dependent
central banks attempting to exploit a short-run
Phillips Curve relationship, accepting higher in-
flation in order to achieve higher output?
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) found
no systematic effect of central bank indepen-
dence (using either of their two indicators) on
the growth rate of real output. Alesina and
‘°Cukiermandid not actually use the rate of inflation, but the




where a~ is the inflation rate in period t. The use of d, as
noted by Cukierman, moderates the effects of hyper-
inflation on the results.
“Capie, Mills and Wood (1992) also studied the link between
inflation and central bank independence. Their data set
consisted of 12 countries, with the data series beginning
between 1871 and 1916 and ending in 1987. Central
banks were classified as either dependent or independent
according to the extent of their control over monetary poli-
cy. The authors examined the relationship between the sta-
tus of the central bank and inflation over the entire sample
period and four subsample periods—pre-World War I, the
Interwar Years, Bretton Woods and post-Bretton Woods.
Periods of hyperinflation, however, were excluded from the
data. In all sample periods, the countries with independent
central banks were in the low inflation group. Nevertheless,
some of the dependent central banks were also in this
group. The authors concluded that independence may be a
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Figure 3
Average Real GNP Growth: 1955-1 987
Percent
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Summers (1993) likewise found no correlation
between average economic growth or the varia-
bility of growth and the level of central bank
independence (figures 3 and 4)12
De Long and Summers (1992) looked at the
relationship between central bank independence
and output per worker while trying to eliminate
differences between countries that were due
solely to convergence effects.” To do this, they
examined the growth rate of real gross domes-
tic product (GDP) per worker during 1955—90,
controlling for the level of GDP per worker in
1955.’~This procedure showed a positive rela-
tionship between central bank independence
and economic growth.” More precisely, they
found that holding constant the 1955 level of
real output per worker, a unit increase in their
index of central bank independence was as-
sociated with a 0.4 pem’centage point incm-ease in
growth per year.”
In contrast, Cukierman, Kalaitzidakis, Summers
and Webb (1993) found that output growth in
industrialized countries was unrelated to central
bank independence even after controlling for
structural factors that might influence growth.
The factors they considered were the initial level
l2The results are the same if per capita gross national
product (GNP) is used rather than GNP.
“Standard neoclassical growth models suggest that growth
rates of economies tend to converge over time. Thus given
two countries, the one with the lower per capita output will
have a higher growth rate than the other until their levels
of real output per capita converge.
‘~GDPper worker levels are based on the Summers and
Heston (1991) estimates, which use purchasing power
parity conversions.
ISThis study does not take into account that the degree of in-
dependence of the central bank of New Zealand changed
dramatically in 1989. Furthermore, all of thestudies, with the
exception of Alesina (1988), do not take into account that
there was an institutional change in the structure of the
Bank of Italy in 1981 that increased its independence. The
latter change, however, was not as substantial as the former.
“De Long and Summers regress the average growth rate of
GDP per worker over the period 1955-90 on GDP per worker
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Source: Alesina and Summers (1993).26
of a country’s GDP, its initial enrollment rates for
primary and secondary education, and changes
in its terms of trade. The authors did find,
however, using the turnover rate of central
bank governors as a proxy for independence,
that central bank independence did have a posi-
tive effect on growth in developing countries.
The difference in the results for industrialized
countries versus developing countries they ar-
gue, may imply that “dependence on political
authorities is bad for growth only when the lev-
el of independence is sufficiently high.” Cen-
tral bank independence is higher’ in all the
industrialized countries than in most of the de-
veloping countries.
Central Bank Independence and
Fiscal Deficits
Another area of empirical study has been the
relationship between central hank independence
and fiscal deficits. The motivation for these
studies is the belief that independent central
banks should be better able to resist govern-
ment efforts to have them monetize deficits.
Thus governments realizing that there may he
some limit on their ability to issue bonds con-
tinuously to finance deficits may decide to limit
deficit spending.
Parkin (1987) investigated this question for the
sanie 12 countries as Bade and Parkin for the
period 1955_83.18 lie found that there was some
evidence of a negative relationship between cen-
tral hank independence and the long-run be-
havior of government deficits as a percent of
gross national product (GNP). The deficits of
Switzerland and Germany, the countries with the
highest levels of central bank independence, had
long-run equilibrium values near zero with little
variance. However, other countries, notably
France, that had low levels of central bank in-
“See Bade and Parkin (1985).
Figure 4
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S
“See Cukierman, Kalaitzidakis, Summers and Webb (1993),
p. 42.27
dependence also had small long-run deficits as a
percent of GNP.
Masciandaro and Tabellini (1988) looked at fis-
cal deficits as a percent of GDP in Australia,
Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United
States during the period 1970—85.” They found
that New Zealand, which had the lowest level of
central hank independence of the five countries
during this period, had the highest fiscal deficit
as a percent of GDP. The United States,
however, with the highest level of central bank
independence among this group of countries,
had a deficit/GDP ratio similar to those of the
other countries.
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tahellini (1991) found
that there was generally a negative correlation
between the deficit/GNP ratio and the degree of
central hank independence. However, if political
factors, as well as central hank independence,
were included in their regression, the latter
variable was insignificant.” Thus they conclude
that an independent monetary authority appar-
ently does not discourage the government from
running fiscal deficits.
A further examination of the relationship be-
tween fiscal deficits and central hank indepen-
dence, which is consistent with the work done
by Alesina arid Summer’s and Dc Long and Sum-
mers, is presented here.21 Using the same index
of central bank independence and the same 16
countries as these previous papers, there is
some evidence of a negative correlation be-
tween average deficits as a percent of GDP and
central bank independence for the period
1973—89, as shown in figure 5,22 The degree of
independence, however, is not a statistically
significant (at a = .05) determinant of the
deficit/GDP ratio. The variability of deficits as a
percent of GDP is also negatively correlated
with central bank independence (figure 6) and
this relationship is statistically significant.
EVALUATION OF THE EMPIRICAL
STUDIES
At first glance, these studies seem to indicate
that a country that wants to lower its inflation
rate and do so without hurting growth should
create an independent central hank. Such a cen-
tral bank apparently could also help reduce fis-
cal deficits and increase output. ‘These benefits
would explain the recent popularity of indepen-
dent central banks. Thus Grilli, Masciandaro
and Tahellini commented:
Having an independent central hank is almost
like having a fr-ce lunch; there are benefits hut
no apparent costs in terms of macroeconomic
performance.”
Alesina and Summer-s (1993) went a step further
in concluding their findings: “Most obviously
they suggest the economic performance merits
of central hank independence.”~
A more careful analysis of these studies,
however, indicates weaknesses that highlight
the need for fum’ther evidence before one
should believe that creating an independent cen-
tral hank will improve a country’s economic
performance. The following four weaknesses
are considered: 1) the difficulty in measuring
central bank independence; 2) the possibility of
a spurious relationship between independence
and economic performance; 3) the possible en-
dogeneity of central bank independence; and 4)
the inclusion of the fixed exchange rate period
in the sample data of some of the studies.
The measures of central hank independence
used in empirical studies have been determined
by establishing a set of factors thought to be
relevant for independence and them) analyzing
central bank charters and laws for compliance
with these factors. With the exception of the in-
“The deficits are as a percent of GNP for Japan.
2oThese political factors include the frequency of government
changes, significant changes in the government and the
percent of governments in a given period supported by a
single majority party.
2’See Alesina and Summers (1993) and De Long and Sum-
mers (1992).
‘2The 1989 ending date was chosen because of the change
in the status of the Bank of New Zealand, which occurred
in 1989. All data are from the International Monetary Fund,
International Financial Statistics.
22See Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), p. 375.
24See Alesina and Summers (1993), p. 159. Even the press
has picked up the banner of central bank independence. A
recent headline in The Washington Post proclaimed: “More
Independence Means Lower Inflation, Studies Show.” See
Berry (1993).28
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dcx created by Cukierman, all of the indexes of
independence apply equal weight to each factor-.
Fom instance, the Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabelli-
ni index based on political measures of indepen-
dence gives a country one point if no one on
the central bank board is appointed by the
government and one point if the policy formu-
lated by the central bank does not require ap-
proval by the government. Although the latter
certainly places a greater constraint on the ac-
tions of the central bank than the former, the
two are treated the same empirically.
Another concern is that the studies are based
on a legal measure of independence that may
not reflect a bank’s de:racto level of indepen-
dence. if there is a difference between legal and
practical independence, studies based on the
former type of measures may provide mislead-
ing results. Cukierman (1992), in an attempt to
address this possibility, uses central hankers’
responses to a questionnaire to determine the
actual degree of independence in the 1980s. He
finds that the correlation between the legal in-
dex and this practical index of independence is
0.33 for developed countries, 0.06 for devel-
oping countries and 0.04 overall.” This finding
indicates, as Cukiermnan notes, that a legal index
of independence is not useful for studying de-
veloping countries. It also indicates that a legal
index may he a weak measure of actual in-
dependence for the developed countries.
There also may be hias in the factors selected
to measure independence. For’ example, Grilli,
Masciandaro and Tahellini include: “statutory re-
quirements that central hank pursues monetary
stability amongst its goals” in their index.” Like-
wise, a central hank is more independent under
Cukierman’s svstemn if price stability is its only
objective than if price stability is one of a num-
ber of objectives or not an objective at all. Us-
ing the goal of price stability as a measure of
central hank independence may result in a bias
between the measure of independence and the
inflation rate.
‘The problems in developing precise measures
of central bank independence are less important,
however, if there is a consensus in ranking cen-
tral banks within broad levels of independence.
Table T lists 16 OECD countries along with their
abis
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relative rankings as gi~ en by Alesina, Cukierman,
and Alesina and Summers.’ All agree that Swit-
zerland and Germany have the most ‘ndependent
central banks of the countries studied. There
are, however, a few countries ~ hich are ranked
quite differently by the authors. For e ample,
Japan has the second louest le~ el of indepen-
dence of all 16 countries, according to Cukier-
man, whereas Alesina, and Alesin r md Summers
give it a much higher level of independence.
This discrepancy over’ the degree of indepen-
dence of the Bank of Japan is not due solely to
differences in factor-s considered in measuring
independence. The index used by Alesina is
based on the criteria of independence created
by Bade and l’arkin (1985). ‘[he index used by
Alesina and Sumnmers is constructed by averag-
ing the indexes created by Alesina, and Grilli,
Masciandaro and Tahellini. Bade and Parkin
claim that the Bank of Japan is independent
from the government in formulating and im-
plementing monetary policy, and Grilli, Mascian-
dat’o and Tabellini claim that there are no
provisions for handling policy conflicts between
the Bank of .lapan and the government. In con-
trast, Cukierman claims that the Bank of Japan
and the government formulate policy jointly and
“The correlations are based on the weighted indexes,
Giving each factor related to independence an equal
weight in the indexes results in a correlation of 0.01 for de-
veloped countries and 0.00 for developing countries.
“See Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), p. 368.
27The measure of independence developed by Cukierman is
based on more factors than the measure used by Alesina,
and Alesina and Summers. Thus Cukierman’s rankings are
more delineated than the other two.30
further notes that in the case of a policy con-
flict, the executive branch of the government
has final authority.”
Since most of the empirical studies consider
only centtal bank independence as a deter-
mninant of economic performance, it is possible
that if other factors are accounted for, these
results could he spurious. Grilli. Masciandaro
and Tahellini attempt to account for other fac-
tors that could affect the rate of inflation by in-
cluding political variables. ‘l’hey find that after
accounting for political factors, central bank in-
dependence was still negatively related to infla-
tion in the countries studied over the period
1950-~-89.The incorporation of political variables
is a step in the right direction, but other factors
also should he considered. As noted by Cukier-
man, “monetary policy is generally sensitive to
shocks to government revenues and expendi-
tures, employment, and the balance of pay-
ments.” The types of shocks that a country
experienced over the sample period and the
reaction of the central bank to these shocks can
affect its economic performance. A study by
Johnson and Siklos (1992) found that the reac-
tions of centr’al banks (as measured by changes
in interest rates) to shocks to unemployment in-
flation and world interest rates were not closely
related to standard measures of central bank in-
dependence.
Empirical use of these indexes may he proble-
matic if central hank independence is an en-
dogenous variable in the sense that countries
with a commitment to pr-ice stability may have a
greater’ propensity for independent central
hanks. If this is true, the mere establishmnent of
an independent bank without a commitment to
price stability will not bring inflation benefits to
a country. In fact, a public aversion to inflation
predates the establishment of many independent
centm’al banks. This was true for the creation of
the Bundesbank and more recently with respect
to central banks in Chile and New Zealand. New
Zealand had one of the highest inflation rates of
all industrialized countries in the 1980s. in 1989
legislation was passed to increase the indepen-
dence of its central bank substantially. This
change is often credited with bringing inflation
down to near- zero. ‘though the legislation cer-
tainly formalized the country’s commitment to
price stability, Ne%v Zealand had succeeded in
reducing its inflation i-ate from nearly 16 per-
cent in 1987 to 6 pem’cent before the creation of
an independent central hank.
In theory, the degree of independence of a
central hank should not be a determinant of a
country’s inflation performance under a fixed
exchange rate system because monetary policy
cannot be set exogenously.’°During the Bretton-
Woods era, it is not clear that any central hank
(with the possible exception of the U.S. Federal
Reserve) could be considered independent in the
sense of an ability to pursue an independent
monetary policy.” Thus the empirical finding of
a negative relationship between independence
and inflation when the sample period extends
over both the Bretton Woods and post-Bretton
Woods eras may indicateaflaw in these studies.
To assess the effect of central bank indepen-
dence on inflation, the data used in these
studies could he divided into two periods. If no
evidence of a relationship between indepen-
dence and inflation is found in the Bretton
Woods period, this would strengthen the under-
lying argument of these studies that central
bank independence is a primary detem’minant of
a country’s inflation performance.” If, however,
evidence is found of a relationship between cen-
tm’al hank independence and inflation in the
Bretton Woods period, this would conflict with
theory and could indicate that the empirical
findings are spurious.
THEORETICAL MODELS OF FIS—
CAL AND MONETARY POLICY IN—
TERACTIONS
In contrast to the empirical studies, the theo-
retical studies of central bank independence and
economic performance concentrate on the con-
flicts that can arise when monetary and fiscal
policy are delegated to independent institutions.
in this literature an independent central bank is
one that does not cooperate with the fiscal au-
“Aufricht (1961) reproduces the Bank of Japan charter and
subsequent changes in its governing regulations, which
support the conclusion reached by Cukierman.
“See Cukierman (1992), p. 438.
‘°SeeMcCallum (1989), pp. 285-88, for an explanation of the
limitations on monetary policy under a fixed exchange rate
system.
“Indeed, the primary argument in favor of a flexible ex-
change rate system was that such a system would permit
individual countries to pursue independent monetary poli-
cies. See, for example, Friedman (1953) and Johnson
(1969).
“This is Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini’s finding (1991).31
thorities in setting economic policy. A depen-
dent central bank is one that cooperates with
the fiscal authority in setting policy.
ln examining the theoretical implications of
central bank independence, this paper focuses
on models in which the policymaking process is
decentralized.” ‘The basic framework of these
models is as follows. The government controls
fiscal policy, and the central bank controls
monetary policy. Both parties set goals for the
economy (generally inflation and output targets)
and assign priority to these goals. The goals and
priorities may differ across the policymakers.
Each institution uses the instruments available
to it in an attempt to reach its goals. In most
models the central bank controls the growth
r’ate of the monetary base and the government
controls fiscal spending. There is an underlying
model of the economy that indicates how fiscal
and monetary policy will affect the relevant eco-
nomic variables. All of the models assume that
there are no stochastic shocks to the economy.
The government and the central bank can
either cooperate in implementing their policies
or choose not to cooperate. If they do not co-
operate, they either can set policies simultane-
ously, or one party can set its policies first and
the other then adopts its policies in reaction to
these.
Consider Andersen and Schneider’s (1986) sim-
ple model in which the government and the
central bank establish targets for inflation and
output.” ‘i’he further the actual level of output
and rate of inflation are from their respective
targets, the more disutility each authority re-
ceives. Thus, using the following equations,
each authority can be modeled as setting policy
to minimize its respective loss functions:”
(1) L1
= a1ly —y~’+ b1.U’r — it,.)’
(2)L,,, = a,,,(y—y,)’ +
(~)~ ~ Y~ y,,,
where~
is the fiscal authority’s loss function
L,,, is the monetary authority’s loss function
y is output
it is intlation
is the fiscal authority’s output target
y~, is the monetary authority’s output tar-get
is the fiscal authority’s inflation target
Tim ~5the monetary authority’s inflation target
a is the weight placed on the output target
b is the weight placed on the inflation target
Andersen and Schneider compare the economic
outcomes under cooperation vs. noncooperation
given three different models of the economy.
‘The first model is Keynesian in nature. This is a
short-run model with price sluggishness so that
even anticipated changes in policy affect ag-
gregate demand. The level of output and the
rate of inflation prevailing in the economy are
affected by both fiscal and monetary policies,
which can he shown in a simple reduced form
model with the following equations:
where f is the fiscal policy instrument and m is
the monetary policy instrument.”
(4)y = y,f+ y,mn 0<y,<y0
(5) it 9,,f + Ow
in the second model, which Andersen and
Schneider refer to as Keynesian-New Classical,
anticipated monetary policy is neutral; it can af-
fect only inflation. Thus in a world of certainty,
equation (4) becomes the following:
(6) y =
(7) it =r~f + in
“There have been studies concentrating solely on monetary
policy that have shown that better economic outcomes
result from the policymaker placing a greater weight on in-
flation than society as a whole. Rogoff (1985) argues that
these results indicate the economic benefits of central
bank independence. These studies ignore the interaction of
fiscal and monetary policy in determining economic out-
comes and thus are not discussed here.
“Generally it is assumed that the government places more
weight on meeting its output target than its inflation target,
whereas the opposite holds for the central bank. Further-
more, it is generally assumed that the inflation and output
targets set by the government are greater than or equal to
the targets set by the central bank,
“The quadratic nature of the loss functions, which is stan-
dard in the macroeconomic game theory literature, implies
that deviations on either side of the targets produce an
equal loss to the policymaker.
“The restrictions in equations (4) and (5) imply that fiscal
policy has a greater (lesser) effect on output (inflation) than
does monetary policy.
In the third model, the economy is New Classical
in nature, characterized by perfect price flexibi-
lity and national expectations. Anticipated policy,
a1 b1 both fiscal and monetary, affects only inflation,
not output. The economy is modeled by the fol-
b,, a,,, lowing equations:32
(8)y = it — it’
(9.) it — = !7Jff~+
where y now refers to output relative to capaci-
ty and the superscript e refers to the expecta-
tion of the variable. Output can be increased
above capacity only tht-ough unanticipated infla-
tion, and unanticipated inflation can occur only
through unanticipated changes in fiscal policy,
monetary policy or both.
The relevant issue for policy is the size of the
loss to each policymaker under cooper’ation and
noncooperation. Cooperation in the determina-
tion of monetary and fiscal policies is modeled
by the government and the central bank choos-
ing the policy variables (f and m) to minimize a
weighted average of their loss functions:
(10) win L = pL1
+ (i’~~P)Lm
f,m
+ (1— p)[am(—j~)’ + bm(it—it,,,)’],
where the weight placed on each loss function
is determined by the relative bargaining strength
of the two parties. Solving this minimization
problem yields the equilibrium values for output
and inflation, which can he substituted into the
loss functions for the governmnent, equation (1),
and the central bank, equation (2), to determine
the loss to each.
As noted ahove, noncooperation can he mnodel-
ed in two ways. in the first, fiscal and monetary
policies are chosen simultaneously; that is, the
government selects a level of spending to mini-
mize its loss function, equation (T), taking as
given the actions of the central bank. At the
same time, the central bank chooses the growth
rate of the monetary base to minimize its loss
function, equation (2), taking as given the actions
of the government. This structure is referred to
as a Nash game and the resulting equilibrium is
called a Nash equilibrium. In a Nash equilibrium,
neither authority, taking the actions of theother
as given, can decrease its loss by unilaterally
changing its policy.
In the second model of noncooperation, one
policy is set before the other is determined.
This process is known as a Stackelberg game,
and the policvmaker who moves first is known
as the Stackelberg leader, whereas the other
policymaker is known as the Stackelherg follow-
er. The leader chooses its policy, and the fol-
lower sets its policy in reaction. Furthermore,
the leader, in choosing its policy, knows how
the follower will react.
Although the equilibrium level of output and
the rate of inflation vary depending on which
model of the economy is used, in all three
models the cooperative solution is Pareto superi-
or to the noncooperative solution. This result is
invariant to the structure of noncoopet’ation—
Nash or Stackelherg. The performance of the
economy is better under cooperation in the
sense that the losses to the government and the
central hank are each lower than they are un-
der noncooperation. This result holds even if
the government and the central bank each place
the same weight on meeting their inflation tar-
Op i gets relative to their output targets (a1=a,,, and
b1=h,,,) hut maintain different targets.
Andersen and Schneider summarize these
results by noting the following:
When we have two independent authorities
who act in their own selfish interest, then we
quite often observe a conflict over the “right”
policy direction. This result should he kept in
mind when quite often the argument is put for~
ward that an independent monetary authority
should be created Two independent policy-
makers do not automatically guarantee a policy
outcome which is preferred to other outcomes
under different institutional solutions.’~
Alesina and ‘i’abeflini (1987) show that adding
one more target to the loss functions of the
government and the central hank also does not
change the nature ofthe results. Noncooperation
is once again suboptimal.
Adding a time dimension to the model also
does not change the basic result that coopera-
tion can improve the outcome from the per-
spective of both policymakers. Pindyck (1976)
presents one of the first dynamic models
analyzing the strategic interaction of monetary
and fiscal policy. He argues that the
separation of monetary and fiscal control may
considerably limit the ability of either authority
to stabilize the economy, particularly when the
conflict over objectives is at all significant.”
Petit (1989) examines the issue of policy coor-
dination in a continuous time model. The
= p[a~y-y~’+
‘7See Andersen and Schneider (1986), p. 188. “See Pindyck (1976), p. 239.33
government sets targets for output and inflation,
giving higher priority to output. The central
bank targets inflation and the level of interna-
tional reserves, giving higher priority to infla-
tion.” As is standard, the government sets the
level of public expenditures to minimize its loss
function, whereas the central hank sets the
growth of the monetary base to minimize its
loss function.
In this model, policies are set at the beginning
and are unchanged over the period considered.
Once again, cooperation is Pareto superior to the
Nash and the Stackelherg equilibriums. Further-
more, cooperation in this dynamic system leads
to a decrease in the variability of the targets
(particularly prices and international reserves),
and raises the speed of adjustment of the sys-
tem. The latter indicates that, given a shock to
the system, the economy will return more
quickly to its long-run values of output and in-
flation if the government and the central hank
are coordinating their policies. Thus Petit con-
chides that policymakers should coordinate their
policies.”
Other studies concentrate on the interaction
of the government and the central bank in
financing fiscal deficits where the deficit must
be financed through bonds, seignorage or
both.’’ Under the assumption that there is some
limit on the ability of a government to continu-
ally issue bonds to finance its deficit, the need
for inflation revenues becomes important.~’Sar-
gent and Wallace (1981) conducted the seminal
research on this question and showed that if
the government embarks on a path of unsus-
tainable deficits, the central hank might eventu-
ally he forced to inflate to fund the deficits. If
the public realizes that the government debt is
on such a path, it will expect inflation to in-
crease, which may cause inflation to increase
well before the debt limit has been reached.”
This outcome is a result of the government be-
ing able to set its policies and the central bank
having to react to those policies (a Stackelherg
game).”
En general, a conflict over the public debt can
arise at any time when the government and the
central hank are allowed to adopt independent
policies. Tahellini (1986) develops a dynamic
model in which the central bank sets targets for
changes in the monetary base and the stock of
outstanding public debt while the government
sets targets for’ the fiscal def’icit net of interest
payments and the stock of outstanding public
debt. The target value of public debt is the
same for both authorities. In choosing the level
of the monetary base and the fiscal deficits, the
two authorities are constrained by the govern-
ment’s d namic budget constraint.” The stock
of public debt as a proportion of income is con-
sidered too high by both the fiscal and mone-
tary authorities. In the noncooperative setting,
however’, each authority ignores the benefit to
the other of its own actions to reduce the level
of debt. In the cooperative setting these benefits
are internalized, resulting in a lower level of
debt.
‘I’ahellini (1987) and Loewy (1988) provide two
more examples of models examining the conflict
between central banks and governments over
fiscal policy. Both show that such a conflict can
lead to an increase in government debt. As not-
ccl by Blackburn and Christensen (1989), a con-
flict will always arise between a central bank
whose goal is to maintain price stability and a
government whose objective is to increase out-
put and is pursuing this goal by running a
stream of large deficits. Such a macroeconomic
program is infeasible; one party will have to re-
vise its strategy (give in). The conflict creates
“The target for international reserves reflects a balance of
payments objective.
40Hughes Hallett and Petit (1990) also model the interaction
of fiscal and monetary policy in a dynamic setting, reach-
ing this same conclusion.
“Seignorage is the revenue received from the creation of
money. It occurs because base money costs only a fraction
of its face value to produce.
“As the public debt grows, there may be increasing concern
among bondholders that the government will be unable to
repay the bonds,
“As Sargent and Wallace note, if money demand today de-
pends on inflationary expectations, then the price level to-
day is a function of not only the current money supply, but
also expectations of the future levels of the money supply.
“The concern that undisciplined fiscal policies could result
in inflation was recognized by the EC in drafting the Treaty
on European Monetary Union. In the regulations concern-
ing the proposed European Central Bank, the bank is pro-
hibited from financing fiscal deficits of the member
countries.
As pointed out by Sargent and Wallace, and expounded
on by Darby (1984), the need for the central bank to mone-
tize government debt through an inflationary policy is
based on the assumption that the rate of growth of the real
economy is less than the real rate of interest,
“Note that monetary base and fiscal deficits in this model
are both instruments and targets.34
problems for the economy because of the un-
certainty over the future course of policy: the
public can expect higher inflation or higher tax-
es, depending on which policymaker gives in.~’
EVALUATION OF THE
THEORETICAL LITERATURE
The theoretical studies indicate that noncoor-
dination of fiscal and monetary policies will
result in a suboptimal economic performance
from the perspective of both the government
and the central bank. Policy targets are more
closely met when coordination occurs. Thus an
independent central bank is not conducive to
achieving better policy outcomes.
However, the theoretical work, like the empir-
ical studies, has its weaknesses. One criticism is
that the models are too simplistic. Neither the
preference structures of the two authorities,
nor the models of the economy, are completely
specified. Furthermore, most of the models
operate in a world of certainty. Policy, however,
is not made in a world of certainty. Extrinsic
uncertainty—shocks to the economy—can drive
a wedge between the implementation of policy
and its outcome. Intrinsic uncertainty—lack of
knowledge of the preferences of a policymaker—
is incorporated only in Tabellini and Loewy’s
models.” As these two models illustrate, adding
uncertainty can increase the policy conflict be-
tween an independent central hank and fiscal
authority.
in addition to assuming certainty, the models
also omit one important player in these policy
games—the public. Public perception of the
credibility of a macroeconomic program is im-
portant to its results because the public can
limit the ability of policymakers to take advan-
tage of an inflation/output tradeoff. If an in-
dependent central bank can increase the public
perception of the credibility of policy, this in
turn should produce better economic results.”
Another deficiency of this literature is its
failure to address the feasibility of the policymak-
ers’ goals. The output goals set by the govern-
ment, for example, may not be sustainable
without accelerating inflation. Tax and expendi-
tures plans, which lead to a stream of deficits,
may also raise questions about the sustainahility
of fiscal policy. In this environment, an indepen-
dent central bank could he useful if its credible
commitment to price stability forced the govern-
ment to evaluate the sustainahility of its policy
goals. In contrast, centralization of policies
might reduce the long-run economic perfor-
mance of a country when the government’s fo-
cus is short-run performance.
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
AND THE ECONOMY—WHAT DO
WE KNOW?
This paper began with two questions: Why is
the idea of an independent central bank as pop-
ular as it is? Are there economic bemiefits to be
gained fromn having an independent central bank?
Unfortunately, the empirical and theoretical
studies surveyed do not provide cleat- answers.
The empirical studies find that there is a nega-
tive correlation between central bank indepen-
dence and long-run average inflation. They also
show a negative correlation between indepen-
dence and long-run average government deficits
as a percent of GDP. In general, they find no
evidence of a positive correlation between out-
put growth amid central bank independence.
These results all point in the same dim’ection yet
do not provide unequivocal evidence that an in-
dependent central hank will lower inflation and
government deficits and raise a country’s
output.
In sum, these empirical studies provide evi-
dence of a negative correlation between central
hank independence and inflation and central
bank independence and fiscal deficits, but they
do not provide evidence of causality. Countries
with an aversion to inflation may formalize this
aversion through the creation of an independent
central bank. If this is true, it is the inflation
aversion, not the independence of the central
hank, that is the primary causal factor behind
the low inflation result. ‘the empirical measures
themselves are biased toward the finding that
“A government may adopt a strategy of running deficits,
through decreasing taxes, to force future governments to
cut expenditures. Under this strategy, the government
would prefer an independent central bank, which will re-
fuse to monetize the deficits and thereby increase the
likelihood that fiscal spending wilt be reduced. See Sargent
(1985) for a discussion of this type of strategy.
“See Tabellini (1987) and Loewy (1988). In Tabellini’s model
the government is initially unaware of the preferences of
the central bank. In Loewy’s model both parties are initially
unaware of the preferences of the other,
“This issue has been studied in the literature that focuses
only on monetary policy. See Blackburn and Christensen
(1989) for a survey of this literature.35
independence promotes low inflation. This is he-
cause the measun’es place much weight on legal
requirements that a central hank pursue prue
stahility and place this goal above all others.
Cukierman is explicit in stating that his measure
of independence:
is not the independence to dm~anything that the
central bank pleases. It is rather the ability’ of
the hank to stick to the price stability objective
even at the cost of other si,ort~termnreal ohjec-
I t’,’es.”
Given such a definition of independence, it is
not sur’pm’ising that independence is equated
with low inflation.
Theoretical studies indicate that an indepen-
dent central hank can increase policy conflicts
with the government whenever the preferences
of the two differ and, in so doing, worsen the
economic performance of a country. These
studies, however, do not provide overwhelming
support for the idea that countries should place
monetary policy in the hands of the executive or
legislative branches of government. The simple
structure of these models ignores some factors
that affect the outcome of policy decisions—
for example, the role of the public and the
overall credibility of policy. Central bank in-
dependence may enhance credibility and thus
the overall effectiveness of a policy program.
in sum then, in the empirical studies, empha-
sis on price stability and freedom to pursue this
goal are primary determinants of independence.
In the theoretical studies independence is eq-
uated with noncooperation between the fiscal
and monetary authorities in policy implementa-
tion. These different definitions of indepen-
dence may partly explain the different results.
Furthermore, countries that may he classified as
independent using the empirical definition mnay
he classified as dependent using the theoretical
definition. New Zealand is one such example.
The 1989 Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act
made price stability the only goal of the central
bank, and the central hank is ft-ce to adopt poli-
cies to achieve that goal. Thus according to the
empirical definition of independence, the 1989
act created an independent central hank in New
Zealand. The central hank’s inflation target,
hoivever, is established by the government for a
multi-year period. The governor’ of the central
hank signs an agreement pledging the bank to
adopt policies to meet this target. Such coopera-
tion hetween the monetary and fiscal policy-
makers is consistent with a dependent central
hank in the theoretical models.
Altogether these studies indicate that we are
far from fully- understanding the role of central
bank independence in producing favorahie eco-
nomnic outcomes.
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